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Abstract—With the rapid progress of recent years, techniques
that generate and manipulate multimedia content can now guar-
antee a very advanced level of realism. The boundary between
real and synthetic media has become very thin. On the one
hand, this opens the door to a series of exciting applications in
different fields such as creative arts, advertising, film production,
video games. On the other hand, it poses enormous security
threats. Software packages freely available on the web allow any
individual, without special skills, to create very realistic fake
images and videos. So-called deepfakes can be used to manipulate
public opinion during elections, commit fraud, discredit or
blackmail people. Potential abuses are limited only by human
imagination. Therefore, there is an urgent need for automated
tools capable of detecting false multimedia content and avoiding
the spread of dangerous false information. This review paper
aims to present an analysis of the methods for visual media
integrity verification, that is, the detection of manipulated images
and videos. Special emphasis will be placed on the emerging
phenomenon of deepfakes and, from the point of view of the
forensic analyst, on modern data-driven forensic methods. The
analysis will help to highlight the limits of current forensic tools,
the most relevant issues, the upcoming challenges, and suggest
future directions for research.
Index Terms—Digital image forensics, video forensics, deep
learning, deepfakes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fake multimedia has become a central problem in the last
few years, especially after the advent of the so called Deep-
fakes, i.e., images and videos manipulated using advanced
deep learning tools, like autoencoders (AE) or generative
adversarial networks (GAN). With this technology, creating
realistic manipulated media assets may be very easy, provided
one can access large amounts of data. Applications include
movie productions, photography, video-games and virtual re-
ality. The very same technology, however, can also be used for
malicious purposes, like creating fake porn videos to blackmail
people, or building fake-news campaigns to manipulate the
public opinion. In the long run, it may also reduce trust in
journalism, including serious and reliable sources. Figure 1
shows some popular deepfakes circulating on the internet.
These fakes are easy to spot since they were generated for fun
and involve well-known actors and politicians in unlikely situ-
ations. In addition, on the web it is usually possible to retrieve
both the original and the manipulated version, removing any
doubt about authenticity. However, verifying digital integrity
becomes much more difficult if the video portrays a less known
person and only the manipulated version is publicly available.
This scenario takes place, for example, if the attacker films a
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Fig. 1. Examples of deepfake manipulations from YouTube. Top: manipulated
videos; bottom: original videos. It is worth noting that in the real videos
Obama and Trump are impersonated by comic actors.
new video on his own, with a collaborative actor whose face is
eventually replaced by the target face. Governmental bodies,
enforcement agencies, the news industry, and also the man in
the street are becoming acutely aware of the potential menace
carried by such a technology. The scientific community is
asked to develop reliable tools for automatically detecting fake
multimedia.
Actually, this is not a new problem. Image manipulation has
been carried out since photography was born1, and powerful
image/video editing tools, such as Photoshop R©, After Effects
Pro R©, or the open source software GIMP, have been around
for a long time. Using such conventional signal processing
methods, images can be easily modified, obtaining realistic
results that can fool even a careful observer. Figure 2 shows
some examples of skillfully manipulated images that have
been disseminated on the Internet in recent years to spread
false news, both on images2 and videos3. In fact, research
in multimedia forensics has been going on for at least 15
years [1], [2], and is receiving ever growing attention, not
only from the academy, but also from major information
technology (IT) companies and funding agencies. In 2016,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
of the U.S. Department of Defense launched the large-scale
Media Forensic initiative (MediFor) to foster research on
media integrity, with important outcomes in terms of methods
and reference datasets.
Following the MediFor taxonomy, digital media verifica-
tion should look for physical integrity, digital integrity, and
semantic integrity. In the literature, several methods have been
proposed, which expose physical inconsistencies, concerning
1https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2107109/Iconic-Abraham-
Lincoln-portrait-revealed-TWO-pictures-stitched-together.html
2https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/26/us/emma-gonzalez-photo-doctored-
trnd/index.html
3https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/i-faked-the-yanis-
varoufakis-middle-finger-video-says-german-tv-presenter
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2Fig. 2. Examples of fake multimedia where two different versions of an
image/video can be retrieved from the web. In one image Emma Gonzalez
(left) an american activist is tearing up the American Constitution, while in a
video Yanis Varoufakis (right) a greek politician is giving the middle-finger
gesture to Germany.
for example shadows or illumination or perspective [3], [4],
[5]. Modern sophisticated manipulations, however, are more
and more effective in avoiding such pitfalls and methods
which test digital integrity are by far more widespread and
represent the current state of the art. Indeed, each image or
video is characterized by a number of features, which depend
on the different phases of its digital history: from the very
same acquisition process, to the internal camera processing
(e.g. demosaicing, compression), to all external processing and
editing operations [6]. Digital manipulations tend to modify
such features, leaving a trail of clues which, although invisible
to the eye, can be exploited by pixel-level analysis tools.
Instead, semantic integrity is violated when the media asset
under analysis conveys information which is not coherent with
the context or with evidence coming from correlated sources.
For example, when objects are copy-pasted from images avail-
able on the web, several near-identical copies can be detected
[7], [8], suggesting a possible manipulation. Moreover, by
identifying the connections among the various versions of the
same asset, it is possible to build its manipulation history
(image and video phylogeny) [9], [10].
Despite the continuous research efforts and the numerous
forensic tools developed in the past, the advent of deep learn-
ing, is changing the rules of the game and asking multimedia
forensics for new and timely solutions. This phenomenon is
also causing a strong acceleration in multimedia forensics
research, which often relies itself on deep learning. There have
been several reviews on this topic [11], [12], [6], [13], [14],
however these last years have witnessed the advent of new
methods. Hence, beyond reviewing the conventional media
forensics approaches, a special attention will be devoted to
deep learning-based approaches and to the strategies designed
to fight deepfakes. The analysis will be restricted to passive
methods and visual data-based solutions. That is, it will be
assumed that no active strategy is in place to ensure integrity,
and that a skilled attacker modified metadata to make them
useless, otherwise they would provide precious information
towards authenticity verification both for images and videos
[15], [16], [17]. On the other hand, it is worth noting that meta-
data are routinely canceled when media assets are uploaded
Splicing (composition) Inpainting (removal) Copy-move (cloning) 
Fig. 3. Examples of image manipulations carried out using conventional
media editing tools. Images come from the dataset of the 1st IEEE Image
Forensics Challenge organized in 2013. From left to right: splicing (alien
material has been inserted in the image), copy-move (an object has been
cloned), inpainting (an object has been hidden by background patches).
on a social network.
The review starts with a brief analysis of the most effective
manipulation methods proposed in recent years (Section II).
Then, integrity verification methods are described, beginning
with conventional approaches (Section III), then moving to
deep learning-based approaches (Section IV), to conclude with
specific deepfake detection methods (Section V). In Section
VI, a discussion of the state of multimedia forensics and
its perspectives after the advent of deep learning is carried
out. A list of the datasets most widespread in the field is
presented in Section VII. Then, the further major themes of
counterforensics (Section VIII) and fusion (Section IX) are
considered. Finally, future research directions are outlined
(Section X) and conclusions are drawn (Section XI).
II. FAKE CONTENT GENERATION
There are many ways to manipulate visual content, and new
methods are proposed by the day. This Section will briefly
review some of the most widespread and promising of them.
Very common operations are adding, replicating or removing
objects, as in the examples of Figure 3. A new object can
be inserted by copying it from a different image (splicing),
or from the same image (copy-move). Instead, an existing
object can be deleted by extending the background to cover
it (inpainting) like in the popular exemplar-based inpainting
[33]. All these tasks are easily accomplished with widespread
image editing packages. Then, some suitable post-processing,
like resizing, rotation or color adjustment, may be required
to better fit the object to the scene, both to improve the
visual appearance and to guarantee coherent perspective and
scale. In recent years, however, the same results are achieved,
with better semantic consistency, through advanced computer
graphics (CG) approaches and deep learning (see Figure 4,
last column). Manipulations that do not require sophisticated
artificial intelligence (AI) tools are sometimes referred to as
“cheap fakes”. Nonetheless, their impact in distorting reality
can be very high. For example, by removing, inserting or
cloning entire groups of frames one can completely change
the meaning of a video. A simple frame-rate reduction was
3Generation
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Fig. 4. Examples of image and video manipulations carried out using deep learning methods. Besides conventional manipulations, like composition [18],
copy-move [19], object removal [20], inpainting [21], a large number of new tasks can be performed. These include content generation [22], [23], image/video
synthesis from semantic labels [24], [25] or sketches [26] or text [27], changes of style and attributes [22], [28], [29], domain translation [30], up to expression
transfer [25], face swapping typical of deepfakes [31] and talking-head video editing [32]. It is worth underlining that deep learning methods require no
manual media editing on the part of the user, except for possible post-processing.
recently used to let Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House
of Representatives, appear as drunk or confused4.
Besides these “traditional” manipulations, concerning spe-
cific areas of the image or video, deep learning and computer
graphics are now offering a large number of new ones. First of
all, a media asset can be synthesized completely from scratch.
To this end, autoencoders and generative adversarial networks
allowed to develop successful solutions [34] especially for
face synthesis, where a high level of photo-realism has been
achieved [35], [22]. It is also possible to generate a completely
synthetic image or video using a segmentation map as input
[36]. Image synthesis is also achievable using only a sketch
[37], [24] or a text description [27]. Likewise, the face of a
person can be animated based on an audio input sequence [38],
[39]. More often, the manipulation modifies existing images
or videos. A well-known example is style transfer [26], [30],
which allows to change the style of a painting, switch oranges
to apples, or reproduce an image in a different season. Major
efforts have been devoted to manipulating faces, for their
high semantic value, and for the many possible applications.
Methods have been proposed to change the expression of a
face [40], [41], to transfer the expression from a source to
a target actor [42], [43], or to swap faces [31]. Recently, it
has been shown that effective face manipulation is feasible
4https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-
videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media/
even without a huge amount of training photos of the targeted
person [44]. It is even possible to animate the face of a
still portrait and express various types of emotions [45].
Beyond faces, some recent work addressed motion transfer:
the target person dances following the movements transferred
from a source dancer [46]. In Figure 4 some examples of
such manipulations are presented. One can easily observe how
realistic they appear and the variety of possible automatic
editing tools available nowadays.
III. CONVENTIONAL DETECTION METHODS
This Section reviews the major lines of research in multi-
media forensics before the emergence of deep learning and
deepfakes. The most popular approaches look for artifacts
related to the in-camera processing chain (camera-based clues)
or the out-camera processing history (editing-based clues)
[47]. A defining property of the approaches proposed so far
is the prior knowledge they rely upon, which impacts on
their suitability for real-world applications. Following this
perspective, first, blind methods will be described, where no
prior knowledge is required. Then, the focus will shift on one-
class methods, which need information only on pristine data,
through a collection of images/videos taken from the camera
of interest or, more in general, a large set of untampered data.
Eventually, supervised methods will be considered, which
rely on a suitable training set comprising both pristine and
manipulated data.
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Fig. 5. An image is captured using an acquisition system whose basic components are represented in this figure. After undesired light components are reduced
using optical filters, the lenses focus the light on the sensor. In order to extract the red-green-blue (RGB) components, a color filter array (CFA) is present.
Each individual sensor element records light only in a certain range of wavelengths. Therefore, the missing color information at a pixel must be recovered
from surrounding pixels, through a process known as color filter array interpolation or demosaicing. Then, a sequence of internal processing steps follow,
including color correction, enhancement and, finally, compression. The implementation and parametrization of all these components differ based on the camera
model and provide important clues that are exploited in the forensic multimedia analysis. Alterations carried out by the malicious user can also introduce
artifacts that allow forensic analyses and detection.
A. Blind methods
Blind approaches do not use any external data for training or
for other forms of pre-processing: they rely exclusively on the
media asset under analysis, and try to reveal anomalies which
may suggest the presence of an manipulation. In particular,
they look for a number of specific artifacts originated by
in-camera or out-camera processing (Figure 5). In fact, the
image formation process inside a camera requires a number
of operations, both hardware and software, which are specific
of each individual camera and leave distinctive traces on the
acquired image. For example, the demosaicing algorithm is
typically different for different camera models. Therefore,
when a manipulation involves the composition of parts of
images acquired from different models, demosaicing-related
spatial anomalies arise. Likewise, the out-camera editing pro-
cess may introduce its own peculiar traces, as well as disrupt
fingerprint-like camera-specific patterns, phenomena which
both allow reliable detection of the attack. Of course, most
of these traces are very subtle and cannot be perceived at a
visual inspection. However, once properly emphasized, they
represent a precious source of information to establish digital
integrity (Figure 6).
1) Lens distortion: each camera is equipped with a com-
plex optical system which cannot perfectly focus light at all
different wavelengths. These imperfections can be used for
forensic purposes. In [48] a method is proposed which exploits
the lateral chromatic aberrations, off-axis displacements of the
light components at different wavelengths that results in a
misalignment between the color channels, while the method
proposed in [49] relies on the aberrations generated by the
interaction between lens and sensor. Improved versions of the
method based on lateral chromatic aberrations, with a more
efficient estimation of local displacements, are proposed in
[50] and more recently in [51]. Finally, in [52] it is exploited
the radial distortion that characterizes the wide-angle lens
typically used for indoor/outdoor video surveillance.
2) CFA artifacts: most digital cameras use a color filter
array (CFA), with a periodic pattern, so that each individual
sensor element records light only in a certain range of wave-
lengths (i.e. red, green, blue). The missing color information
is then interpolated from surrounding pixels, an operation
known as demosaicing. This process introduces a subtle pe-
riodic correlation pattern in all acquired images. Whenever
a manipulation occurs, this periodic pattern is perturbed. In
addition, since CFA configuration and interpolation algorithms
are specific of each camera model [53], [54], when a region is
spliced in a photo taken by another camera model, its periodic
pattern will appear anomalous. One of the first methods to
exploit these artifacts was proposed by Popescu and Farid
[55] back in 2005, based on a simple linear model to capture
periodic correlations. Of course, periodic signals produce
strong peaks in the Fourier domain. This can be used to
distinguish natural images from computer generated images
[55], [56], especially after high-pass filtering the image so as
to extract more effective features [56], [57]. The problem can
be also recast in a Bayesian framework, as proposed in [58],
obtaining a probability map in output which allows for fine-
grained localization of image tampering. In [59] the analysis
is extended to take into account also pixel correlations across
color channels.
3) Noise level and noise pattern: a more general approach
is to highlight noise artifacts introduced by the whole acquisi-
tion process, irrespective of their specific origin. The analysis
of local noise level may help reveal splicings, as shown in
[60], because different cameras are characterized by different
intrinsic noise. Local noise analysis has been proposed using
statistical tools in the image domain [60], [61] or in the
wavelet domain [62]. This approach is also at the basis of
the so-called Error Level Analysis (ELA), widely used by
practitioners for its simplicity. However, noise intensity alone
is not very informative, and may easily provide wrong indi-
cations. Therefore, in [63] the high-pass noise residual of the
image is used to extract rich features which better characterize
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Fig. 6. Localization results of some blind methods for images with copy-move (top) and splicing (bottom). From left to right, manipulated image, ground
truth, and localization heatmaps obtained with methods based on JPEG artifacts, noise patterns, double quantization artifacts, copy-move search. Of course,
copy-move methods are not effective for splicing manipulations.
local neighborhoods. The expectation-maximization algorithm
is then used for clustering these features and reveal possible
anomalies. In all above methods, the noise residual is only
used to detect possible anomalies.
Departing from this “agnostic” approach, the method pro-
posed in [47] uses the noise residual to estimate the imaging
model and define an intrinsic camera fingerprint. Inconsisten-
cies with respect to the estimated model are then used to
discover possible manipulations. A similar idea is extended
to videos in [64], [65], [66] where the noise residuals of
consecutive frames are analyzed and suitable features are
extracted to discover traces of both intra-frame and inter-frame
manipulations. Instead, in [67], the camera dependent photon
shot noise is considered as an alternative fingerprint for static
scenes.
4) Compression artifacts: exploiting compression artifacts,
has long been a workhorse in image forensics. The many
methods proposed in the literature, mostly for JPEG com-
pressed images, can be classified based on the clues they
rely upon. A first popular approach is to exploit the so-called
lock artifact grid (BAG). Because of the block-wise JPEG
processing, discontinuities appear along the block boundaries
of compressed images, giving rise to a distinctive and easily
detected grid-like pattern [68]. In the presence of splicing or
copy-move manipulations, the BAGs of inserted object and
host image typically mismatch, enabling detection. Several
BAG-based methods have been proposed in the literature [69],
[70], [71], some of which even in recent years [72].
Another major approach relies on double compression
traces. In fact, when a JPEG-compressed image undergoes a
local manipulation and is compressed again, double compres-
sion artifacts appear all over the image except in the forged
region [73]. These artifacts change depending on whether the
two compressions are spatially aligned or not, but suitable
detection [74] and localization [75], [76] methods have been
proposed for both cases. Another method relies on the so-
called JPEG ghosts [77], arising in the manipulated area when
two JPEG compressions use the same quality factor (QF). To
highlight ghosts, the target image is compressed at all QFs
and analyzed. Other methods [78], [79] look for anomalies in
the statistical distribution of original DCT samples, assumed
to comply with the Benford law.
A further approach is to exploit the model-specific im-
plementations of the JPEG standard, including customized
quantization tables and post-processing steps [80], [15]. In [81]
model-specific JPEG features have been defined, the JPEG
dimples, which depend on how coefficients are converted from
real to integer: by the ceil, floor, or rounding operator. Also,
chroma subsampling presents specific clues due to integer
rounding [82].
Exploiting compression artifacts for detecting video manip-
ulation is also possible, but is much more difficult because of
the complexity of the video coding algorithm. Traces of MPEG
double compression were first highlighted in the seminal paper
by Wang and Farid for detecting frames removal [83]. In fact,
the de-syncronization caused by removing a group of frames
introduces spikes in the Fourier Transform of the motion
vectors. A successive work [84] tried to improve the double
compression estimation especially in the more challenging sce-
nario when the strength of the second compression increases
and proposed a distinctive footprint, based on the variation of
the macroblock prediction types in the reencoded P-frames.
This same artifact is exploited in [85] where its estimation is
improved to detect traces of inter-frame tampering, and more
recently in [86] to deal with video sequences that contain bi-
directional frames.
5) Editing artifacts: the manipulation process often gener-
ates a trail of precious traces, besides artifacts related to re-
compression. Indeed, when a new object is inserted in an im-
age, it typically needs several post-processing steps to fit well
the new context. These include geometric transformations, like
rotation and scaling, contrast adjustment, but also blurring, to
smooth the object-background boundaries. Therefore, many
papers focus on detecting these basic operations as a proxy for
possible forgeries. Some methods [60], [87] try to detect traces
of resampling, always necessary in the presence of rotation
or resizing by exploiting periodic artifacts. Other approaches
focus on anomalies on the boundaries of objects when a
composition is performed [88], or by blur inconsistencies [89].
A very common manipulation consists in copy-moving
image regions to duplicate or hide objects. Of course, the
presence of identical regions is a strong hint of forgery, but
clones are often modified to disguise traces, and near-identical
natural objects also exist, which complicate the forensic anal-
ysis. Studies on copy-move detection date back to 2003, with
the seminal work of Fridrich [90]. Since then, a large literature
6Fig. 7. The Varoufakis video copy-move. Three versions of the same video
appeared on the web, with radically different content, as per the sample frames
shown on the top row. With reference to the video on the left where the arm is
down, a copy-move detector revealed that a sequence from one video (second
row) was temporally flipped and copy-moved onto another one (bottom row).
For the other two videos the detector was not able to tell apart the pristine
from the forged one, since the discriminative region was too small.
has grown on this topic. Effective and efficient solutions are
now available which allow for copy-move detection even in the
presence of rotation, resizing, and other geometric distortions
[91]. Methods based on keypoints [92], [93] are very efficient,
while dense-field methods [94], [95] are more accurate and
deal also with occlusive attacks. In [96] dense-field methods
have been shown to be effective also to detect inpainting.
Extensions to video have been also proposed both for detection
and localization [97], [98], the main issue being complexity.
In the example of Figure 7, a method for 3D copy-move
localization exposed a copy-move with flipping in one of the
videos. As for inter-frame forgeries, local modifications can be
detected based on the consistency of the velocity field [99].
B. One-class sensor-based and model-based methods
The camera sensor can provide a wealth of precious clues. In
fact, due to manufacturing imperfections, the sensor elements
present small deviations from their expected behavior. Such
deviations form a noise-like pattern, stable in time, called
photo-response non-uniformity (PRNU) noise. All images
acquired by a given camera bear traces of its PRNU pattern,
which can be therefore regarded as a sort of camera fingerprint.
If a region of the image is tampered with, the corresponding
PRNU pattern is removed, which allows one to detect the
manipulation.
PRNU-based forgery detection was first proposed in [100]
based on two steps: i) the camera PRNU pattern is estimated
off-line from a large number of images taken from the camera,
and ii) the target image PRNU is estimated at test time, by
means of a denoising filter, and compared with the reference
(see Figure 8). Clearly, this approach relies on some important
prior knowledge, since a certain number of images taken from
the source device, or the device itself, must be available.
On the other hand, it is extremely powerful, as it can detect
equally well all attacks, irrespective of their nature. The key
problem is the single-image estimation at test time, since
the PRNU pattern is a weak signal, easily overwhelmed by
imperfectly removed image content. To reduce false alarms, in
PRNU fingerprintDevice Images Residuals
Denoising
+
-
Test Image
Denoised Image
PRNU estimate PRNU fingerprint 
Correlation
Correlation field 
Fig. 8. PRNU-based forgery localization. Top: the device PRNU pattern
is estimated by averaging a large number of noise residuals. Bottom: the
image PRNU pattern is estimated through denoising, and compared with the
reference pattern: the low correlation in the telephone booth region suggests
a possible manipulation.
[101] a predictor is designed to adapt the decision threshold
to the local image statistics, while in [102] disturbing non-
unique artifacts are detected and removed. In [103] the strong
spatial dependencies are modeled through a Markov Random
Field so as to make joint rather than isolated decisions.
Further variations rely on the use of guided filtering [104],
discriminative random fields [105] and multiscale analysis
[14].
It is worth noting that this approach can be also extended to
blind scenarios, where no prior information about the camera
is known provided a suitable clustering procedure identifies
the images which share the same PRNU [96], [106].
An alternative to using PRNU is to base the analysis on
camera model local features. Since cameras of the same
model share proprietary design choices for both hardware and
software, they will leave similar marks on the acquired images.
Therefore, in [107] it was proposed to extract local descriptors
from same-model noise residuals to build a reference statistical
model. Then, at test time, the same descriptors are extracted
in sliding-window modality from the target noise residual
and compared with the reference. Strong deviations from
the reference statistics suggest the presence of an attack.
With respect to PRNU-based analysis, this approach cannot
discriminate devices, but only models. On the other hand,
model-related artifacts are much stronger than device-related
PRNU, and provide more reliable information.
C. Supervised methods with handcrafted features
These methods are based on machine learning. Suitable
features are first defined which help discriminating between
pristine and manipulated images, and then a classifier is
trained on a large number of examples of both types. It
is worth underlining that features are hand-crafted by the
forensic analyst, based on a deep understanding of the target
manipulations.
Some features have been devised to detect specific arti-
facts, especially those generated by double JPEG compres-
sion [108], [102], [109] or related to the camera response
function (CRF) [110], [111], [112]. However, more precious
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Fig. 9. Localization results of the same blind methods of Figure 6 after compression (QF=90) or resizing (scale=90%). Model-dependent methods, based on
JPEG or double quantization artifacts, suffer a much stronger performance impairment than methods based on noise pattern anomalies.
are the universal features, based on suitable image statistics,
which allow detecting many types of manipulation. Therefore,
good statistical models for natural images may help selecting
features that guarantee the highest discriminative power. As
already observed, to highlight statistical anomalies caused by
manipulations, one should first remove the high-level image
content, to be regarded as noise [113]. Therefore, the most
effective features are typically extracted from noise residuals,
either in the spatial [114], [115] or in a transform domain
[116], [117]. The pioneering work of Farid and Lyu [118],
back in 2003, proved the potential of features based on high-
order image statistics. These features capture subtle variations
in the image micro-textures and prove effective in many
application fields, such as computer graphics, biometrics, and
steganalysis. Therefore, it is not by chance that the most
popular such features, known as rich models [119], have been
originally proposed for steganalysis and later applied with
success in forensics. After passing the image through a set
of high-pass filters, each one able to capture slightly different
artifacts, the features are formed based on co-occurrence of
selected neighbors. Then, an ensemble classifier is built. In
2013, two methods [120], [96] based on the fusion of these
features and other forensic tools [103], [95] ranked first in
both the detection and localization phases of the first IEEE
IFS-TC Image Forensics Challenge.
D. Discussion
A major appeal of blind methods is that they do not require
further data besides the image/video under test. However,
methods based on very specific details depend heavily on
their statistical model, and mostly fail when the hypotheses
do not hold. With reference to Figure 6, for example, methods
based on JPEG artifacts localize correctly both a copy-move
and a splicing. However, if the image is slightly compressed
(QF=90) or resized (scale 90%), as usual on social networks,
their performance drop dramatically, as shown in Figure 9.
Copy-move detectors, instead, are more reliable, even in the
presence of post-processing, but can only detect cloning and
some types of inpainting. On the contrary, methods based on
noise patterns are quite general, and robust to post-processing,
as they often do not depend on explicit statistical models but
look for anomalies in the noise residual. Moreover, to improve
reliability, they can be used in a supervised modality, as shown
in Figure 10. The analyst can select a suspect region of interest
for testing, using the rest of the image as an intrinsic model
of pristine data.
As for machine learning-based methods, they can achieve
very high detection results: in the 2013 challenge the accuracy
was around 94% [120]. However, performance depends heav-
ily on the alignment between training set and test data. It is
very high when training and test sets share the same cameras,
same types of manipulation, same processing pipeline, like
when a single dataset is split in training and test or cross-
validation is used. As soon as unrelated datasets are used, the
performance drops, sometimes close to 50%, that is, random
guess. Lack of robustness limits the applicability of learning
based approaches to very specific scenarios.
IV. DEEP LEARNING-BASED APPROACHES
Recently, much attention has been devoted to deep learning-
based methods, where features can be directly learnt from the
data. Deep learning has proven successful for many computer
vision applications, largely advancing the state-of-the-art. Is
the same happening in multimedia forensics? How are deep
learning ideas and architectures adapted to address the specific
challenges of this field? This Section will describe deep
8Fig. 10. Using single-asset anomaly-based methods in supervised modality.
If only a well-defined region of interest (RoI) might have been manipulated,
as with these two versions of Whoopy Goldberg, one can restrict the analysis
to the RoI, and use the rest of the image as intrinsic model of pristine data.
A strong anomaly appears in the left version, not in the right one.
learning-based methods proposed for the detection of generic
manipulations. Then, next Section reviews methods for the
detection of GAN-generated images and video deepfakes.
A. Supervised CNNs looking at specific clues
Some papers propose CNN architectures to detect specific
artifacts generated by the editing process. Double JPEG com-
pression, as seen in the previous Section, provides strong clues
for authenticity verification. So, [121] uses the histograms of
DCT coefficients as input to the CNN, while [122] extracts
block-wise histogram-related statistical features, so as to en-
able also localization. To better exploit the peculiarities of
forensics as well as the learning ability of CNNs, the approach
proposed in [123] works on noise residuals rather than on
image pixels and uses the first layers of the CNN to extract
histogram-related features. Good results are achieved also
when test images are compressed with quality factors (QFs)
never seen in training and when conventional methods fail
(second QF larger than the first one). To improve performance,
[124] uses a multi-domain approach relying on both spatial
domain and frequency domain inputs.
Double compression detection has been also extended to
H.264 video analysis in [125], where a two-stream neural
network is proposed to analyze separately intra-coded frames
and predictive frames. A method specifically devised to detect
sequence duplication in videos is proposed in [126]. First
coarse-level matches between candidate clones are identified,
and then a Siamese network based on the ResNet architecture
[127] identifies fine-level correspondences.
Other useful editing inconsistencies arise with composition.
When material from different sources is spliced together,
artifacts can arise at the boundaries. In [128] a multi-task
fully convolutional network is devised, which includes a
specific branch to detect boundaries between inserted regions
and background and another branch for the surface of the
manipulation, while in [129] a segmentation network based
on U-Net is proposed.
Deep learning methods have been also applied to detect
copy-move forgeries. A first solution has been proposed in
[130], where an end-to-end CNNs based approach implements
the three main steps of a classic copy-move solution, i.e.
feature extraction, matching and post-processing to reduce
false alarms. This helps to jointly optimize all the modules
and gives as output the predicted forgery localization maps.
In [131] a different architecture is devised, which includes a
multiscale feature analysis and a hierarchical feature matching,
which seems to better adapt to different scenarios. Overall,
deep learning based methods perform better on low resolution
images with respect to conventional approaches, where prob-
ably parameters have been adapted to high resolution images.
More interestingly it is the analysis carried out in [132],
[133], where the problem of source-target disambiguation is
faced. In fact, copy-move methods typically generate a map
of the original object and its clone, and do not establish
which is the forgerd region. To this end, both in [132] and
in [133], a two-branch architecture is proposed followed by a
fusion module, but the manipulation detection module in [133]
focuses on the presence of interpolation artifacts and boundary
inconsistencies.
Finally, in [134] a CNN based solution is devised to detect
artifacts introduced by a specific Photoshop tool, Face-Aware
Liquify, which performs image warping of human faces. The
model is trained on fake images automatically generated by
the very same tool. To increase robustness, data augmentation
includes resizing (bicubic and bilinear), JPEG compression,
and various types of histogram editing.
B. Generic supervised CNNs
Generic CNN detectors do not look for specific types of
manipulations and artifacts. Of course, training such nets is
very challenging, due to the variety of possible attacks and
data histories.
A first group of methods take inspiration from the hand-
crafted rich models features proposed in [119] and used with
success in image forensics. In [135] and in [136], inspired
by a similar solution used in [137] for steganalysis, a CNN is
proposed with a constrained first layer that performs high-pass
filtering of the image, that suppress the scene content and allow
to work on residuals. In [135], the fixed rich-model filters are
adopted, and the network is used only for feature extraction,
followed by a SVM in charge of making the global decision.
In [136], instead, constrained filter weights are learnt during
training, and the CNN is used also for classification. A slightly
different perspective is considered in [138] where a CNN
architecture is built to exactly replicate the behaviour of the
original rich-model classifier [119]. Then, minor architectural
relaxations allow the network to be fine-tuned on domain-
specific data and further improved. Therefore, a compact
network is obtained which can be trained also on scarce data.
All the methods described above allow for the detection of
small patches. Localization is then possible by using a sliding
window analysis on the whole image.
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suming that high-level features do not help detecting possible
manipulations. However, imperfect image editing, like badly
spliced material, may well leave traces, such as strong con-
trast or unnatural tampered boundaries. Hence, a two-stream
network is proposed in [139] and extended in [140]. On the
first path, rich model filters are used again to extract low-level
features, while a second path relies on the RGB data to look
for high-level traces.
Fixed high-pass filters in the first layer have been used
also more recently in [141], and in combination with standard
filters in [142]. However in both these papers a fully connected
network is proposed in order to obtain as output the binary
localization map, that hence accounts also for detection at
image level. In [141] pixel-wise predictions are obtained
by applying transpose convolutions. It is also observed that
typically the area of a manipulated region is much smaller than
the untouched pixels, and a focal loss is adopted to face this
class imbalance, that assigns a modulating factor to the cross
entropy term. This paper mostly focuses on manipulations cre-
ated using deep learning based inpainting methods, while the
objective of the work proposed in [142] is to detect every type
of possible local manipulations. To this end, the training pro-
cedure is built so as to classify 385 image manipulation types,
and to detect features related to local anomalies. Another
generic solution to detect and localize image manipulations
has been proposed in [143]. Resampling features are used to
capture inconsistencies, long short-term memory (LSTM) cells
highlight transitions between pristine and forged blocks in the
frequency domain, and finally an encoder-decoder network
segments the manipulation. Localization is indeed carried out
in [144] by first introducing a process to generate forged
(harder) examples during training in order to generalize across
a large variety of possible manipulations. Then, a segmentation
and refinement network is used so that the algorithm is forced
to look at boundary artifacts.
In [145], [146], [147] the problem of image-level analysis
for forgery detection is specifically addressed. Some methods
[145], [146] train the CNN to extract compact features at
the patch level, and then perform some forms of external
aggregation to make image-level decisions. However, a patch
level analysis does not allow to take into account at the
same time both local (textural analyses) and global (contextual
analyses) information. This latter requirement is not easily
met, because CNNs accept in input patches that are much
smaller than the whole image needed for contextual analysis.
In computer vision, this problem is solved by resizing the
image, but this process destroys the fine-grain structure of the
image and hides important traces of manipulation [146], [147].
In [147] a gradient checkpointing is used to allow end-to-end
training of both aggregation and feature extraction, allowing
for their joint optimization, without any resizing. This helps
analyzing the whole image through textural-sensitive features
and highlight anomalies that would not appear at the patch
level.
C. One-class training
Assembling a training set representative of all possible
manipulations can be a prohibitive task. Hence, an alternative
is to resort to a one-class approach and look for anomalies
with respect to an intrinsic model of pristine data. Indeed,
any manipulation is by definition an anomaly, and should be
detectable as such. These methods possess then the desirable
property to detect any type of manipulations.
In [148] a single-asset (blind) one-class method has been
proposed. Expressive features are extracted from the noise
residual through an autoencoder, and iterative feature labeling
singles out two classes. The largest class defines the pris-
tine model. Then, various criteria can be used to decide on
whether the data of the second class are also pristine or else
manipulated. In [149], the approach has been extended to
videos by including a LSTM recurrent network to account
for temporal dependencies. In [150], instead, GANs are used
to learn features typical of pristine images, followed by a one-
class SVM trained on them to determine their distribution, and
eventually detect tampering of satellite images.
Several papers leverage the strong connection existing be-
tween source identification and splicing detection and local-
ization. Indeed, in the presence of a splicing, the fact that
different image parts are acquired by different camera models
provides powerful forensic clues. In [151], a CNN is used to
extract camera-model features from image patches, followed
by clustering to detect anomalies. A similar approach is fol-
lowed in [152]. First, a constrained network is used to extract
high-level camera-model features, then, another network is
trained to learn the similarity between pairs of such features.
This work has been recently extended in [153] introducing
a graph-based representation that better captures the forensic
relationships among all image patches within an image. A
Siamese network is also trained in [154] to decide whether
two image patches have similar metadata. Once trained on
pristine images with EXIF header, the network can be used
on any image without further supervision. In [155], [156],
[157] these concepts are exploited to extract a camera-model
fingerprint, called noiseprint, similar to a PRNU-based device
fingerprint. A denoiser CNN is trained in Siamese modality
to tell apart similar (same camera model and same position)
from different couples of patches. Once trained, the network
is able to extract the image-size noiseprint, where artifacts
related to camera model are emphasized. In [155] it is shown
that noiseprints, thanks to their spatial sensitivity, can be used
to detect splicing as well as several other manipulations, while
in [157] the approach is extended to video forensics.
V. DEEPFAKE DETECTION
Human faces are by far the most expressive and
emotionally-charged pieces of information that circulate on the
web. The face is the main biometric trait of a person, a uni-
versal ID card, and a vehicle itself of non-verbal but powerful
messages. Therefore, the appearance of artificial intelligence-
powered tools that generate realistic faces of persons that do
not exist, or modify in a credible way the attributes of faces
in videos, has raised great alarm.
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Fig. 11. Today’s deepfakes sometimes exhibit some obvious asymmetries,
such as eyes of different colors (top) or badly modeled teeth (bottom).
However, such artifacts will likely disappear in the future.
However, computer generated faces already existed before
the deep learning era. Research on distinguishing real from
computer generated faces has been going on for years and
represents a precious starting point. Indeed, fakes generated
with CGI and deep learning have much in common, since
they both lack the characteristic features that are typical of
images and videos of human faces acquired by real cameras. In
[158] face asymmetry is proposed as a discriminative feature
to tell apart computer generated from real images of human
faces. Then, in [159] the focus shifts to videos, and detection
relies on the spatial-temporal deformations of a 3D model that
fits the face. In particular, natural faces follow more complex
and various geometric deformations then synthetic ones, and
cause higher perturbations of the 3D model. Also, natural faces
belong to living persons. So, the method proposed in [160]
relies on the small variations in the appearance of the face
due to the periodic blood flow caused by heart beating.
The following subsections review the work that has been
devoted explicitly to detect local manipulations to images or
videos or fully sinthetic media created using deep learning
strategies. First, the methods based on handcrafted features
will be described, then those relying themselves on deep
learning will be analyzed.
A. Methods based on handcrafted features
A rather general approach is to look for high-level visual
artifacts in the face. Methods following this approach try to
highlight specific failures in the generation process which
does not reproduce perfectly all the details of a real face.
For example, in GAN-generated faces a mismatch may occur
between the color of the left and right eye, as well as other
forms of asymmetry, like a earring only on one side, or ears
with markedly different characteristics. Deepfakes, instead,
often present unconvincing specular reflections in the eyes,
either missing or represented as white blobs, or roughly
modeled teeth, which appear as a single white blob (see Figure
11). All these artifacts are exploited in [161], where simple
features are built in order to capture them. [162] relies on
eye blinking, which has a specific frequency and duration in
humans, which is not replicated in deepfake videos. A solution
based on a long-term recurrent network, working only on eye
sequences, is designed to catch such temporal inconsistencies.
In [163] and in [164] deepfakes are revealed by the lack of
variations induced by heart beating, an idea already exploited
in [160] for computer generated faces. However, in [163]
the coherence of these biological signals is considered both
spatially and along the temporal direction.
Other detection methods rely on face warping artifacts
[165], face landmark locations [166] or head pose inconsis-
tencies [167]. In [165] the approach exploits the fact that
current deepfakes generation methods are able only to generate
limited resolution images, that need to be further warped to
match the original face in the source video. However, warping
leaves peculiar traces that can be detected using a CNN that
works on the face region and its surrounding areas. Instead, the
observation made in [166] is that GAN-based face synthesis
algorithms are able to generate a face with high level of realism
and with many details, but lack an explicit constraint over the
locations of these parts in a face. Hence, the locations of the
facial landmark points, like the tips of the eyes, nose and the
mouth, can be used as the discriminative features for verifying
the authenticity of GAN images. This same problem is also
present in deepfake videos and can be revealed by means of
3D head pose estimation [167].
Other common artifacts of GAN-generated images are re-
lated to how color is synthesized. In fact, the generator is
constrained so as to limit the occurrence of saturated and
under-exposed pixels [168], not infrequent in real images.
Other disparities in color components are exploited in [169],
in fact deep networks generate images in the RGB color
space without any type of constraint on color correlations,
and artifacts arise if looking at features in other spaces such as
HSV and YCbCr, especially in the chrominance components.
A clear advantage of all these methods is that visual
artifacts are not affected by resizing and compression. On
the other hand, fake media that can be recognized also by
human viewers represent less of a menace. Moreover, with
the current pace of technology, it is very likely that next-
generation deepfakes will overcome such imperfections and
synthesize visually perfect fakes.
A different approach is followed in [170]. The idea is to
protect individuals by acquiring some peculiar soft traits that
characterize them and are very difficult to reproduce for a
generator. In particular, it is observed that facial expressions
and head movements are strongly correlated, and changing the
former without modifying the latter may expose a manipula-
tion. On the down side, to apply this approach, a large and
diverse collection of videos in a wide range of contexts must
be available for all individuals of interest.
B. Methods based on deep learning
With reference to GAN images, a first investigation has
been carried out in [171], where several CNN architectures
have been tested in a supervised setting to discriminate GAN
images from real ones. Several solutions appear to be very
effective, but the performance decreases significantly when
training and test mismatch, or when data are compressed
using the pipeline typical of social networks. In [172], as a
preliminary step for forensic analyses, it is shown that each
specific GAN architecture is characterized by its own artificial
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Fig. 12. Localization results provided by a deep network on a pristine video
(top) and a deepfake (bottom). Excellent results are obtained with high-quality
videos, while artifacts appear if the videos are compressed at low bit-rates.
fingerprint, present in all generated images, much like a real
camera is characterized by its PRNU pattern. A similar goal
is pursued in [173] through a suitably trained CNN. This last
work also shows that these fingerprints persist across different
image frequencies and patches, and are not biased by GAN
artifacts. In [174], instead, a GAN simulator is proposed to
reproduce common GAN-image artifacts, which manifest as
spectral peaks in the Fourier domain. Then, a classifier is
trained, which takes the spectrum as input. Another work [175]
tries to attribute a test image to a specific generator in a white-
box scenario. The basic idea is to invert the generation process.
Once the original latent vector is recovered, it is fed again to
the network, and the output is compared with the test image. A
similar idea is also suggested in [176], where using projection-
based methods the authors show that it is possible to detect
that an image was synthesized by a specific network, even if
it is of very high quality.
Switching to solutions for deepfake detection in videos,
in [177] two simple architectures are proposed with a small
number of levels and parameters that exploit mesoscopic
features. A first solution (Meso-4) has four layers of convo-
lutions and pooling and is then followed by a dense network
with one hidden layer. The second solution (MesoInception-
4) instead is based on a variant of the inception module that
includes dilated convolutions. However, experiments carried
out in [178] clearly show that, in a supervised setting, very
deep general-purpose networks [179], [180], [181], outperform
forensics-oriented shallow CNNs, as well as methods based on
handcrafted features, especially in the presence of the strong
compression typical of video codecs. For the detection task
these methods use specific strategies to extract the faces from
the frames, as input to the network. However, also localization
strategies can be devised on the whole frame. In Fig.12 the
pixel-level localization results of a deep network are presented
using the approach described in [182], however this analysis
can be accomplished in different ways [183]. Training on
uncompressed data ensures perfect results on high-quality
videos, while artifacts appear when the test video is strongly
compressed. Further improvements can be obtained by in-
cluding an attention mechanism, as done in [184]. Promising
results are also obtained in [185] by using capsule-network
architectures which require fewer parameters to train than
very deep networks. It should be noted that these methods
operate on still frames. Therefore, to boost performance, the
scores obtained at frame level can be aggregated [177], or else
an ensembling approach can be applied, using different color
spaces as input [186].
Clearly, better results can be expected by strategies that take
explicitly into account the temporal direction. In fact, even if
current generation methods are very effective, they perform
face manipulation on a frame-by-frame basis and hence may
incorrectly follow the face movements. Several methods have
been proposed in the literature to exploit this point. In [187],
[188] a convolutional Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)
network is used to exploit such dependencies and improve
upon single-frame analysis. In [189], instead, a solution based
on recurrent convolutional models has been proposed. Features
are extracted at multiple levels and processed in individual
recurrent networks, in order to exploit micro, meso and
macroscopic features for manipulation detection. A significant
improvement can be achieved even by using only 5 frames. In
[190] the optical flow field is estimated to exploit discrepancies
in motion across frames, but only some preliminary results are
presented.
Despite these interesting results, it must be underlined that
most of these detectors tend to overfit the training set, and per-
form badly on new data [191]. This is becoming a major issue
in multimedia forensics, considering the fast growing number
of deep learning-based manipulation methods. Therefore, new
proposals should ensure good generalization ability, which
calls for better validation of detectors, with multiple datasets
and different types of manipulations. Focus on this problem is
first found in [192], where an autoencoder-based architecture
is proposed which adapts to new manipulations with just
a few examples. This same approach has been followed in
[193] by using a deeper network and including a segmentation
task. An autoencoder is also used in [194], where a pixel-
wise mask is used to enforce the model to learn intrinsic
representation from the forgery region, so as to avoid to detect
artifacts present in the training set. In [195] it is proposed a
method based on incremental learning to reduce the burden
and the risks of re-training networks on larger and larger
datasets as new forms of manipulation appear. A different
perspective is followed in [196], where a pre-processing step
is introduced in order to reduce low level artifacts of GAN
images and force the discriminator to learn more general
forensic features. Instead, in [197] a careful pre- and post-
processing and data augmentation are applied to improve
transferability. The work shows that CNN-generated images
share some common flaws that allow one to trace their origin
even on unseen architectures, datasets and training methods.
The main idea is to make a very large augmentation in the
training step by means of several and different post-processing
operations, like blurring and compression and combinations of
them, even if they are not performed at test time.
Turning to videos, recently some interesting solutions have
been considered to improve generalization. In [198] this is
achieved using hierarchical neural memory networks. Beyond
exploiting long-term dependencies, the method includes an
attention mechanism and an adversarial training strategy. This
helps to increase robustness to compression and to transfer
learning to better deal with unseen manipulations. A com-
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pletely different perspective is followed in [199]. In this work
the focus is on the boundary of forged faces. In fact the
observation is that they all share a common blending operation.
Hence the generalization ability of the network increases, since
it is not based on the artifacts of a specific face manipulation
method. In [157] generalization is gained by training the
method only on pristine videos and by extracting the camera
fingerprint information (noiseprint) gathered from multiple
frames. This can significantly improve the detection results
on various types of face manipulations, even if the network
never saw such forgeries in training.
VI. DEEP LEARNING IN MULTIMEDIA FORENSICS:
CONSIDERATIONS
The review of previous Sections testifies of an exponential
growth in the number of papers proposing deep learning
methods for multimedia forensic problems. But, where are we
now? Are forensic analysts winning or losing their “war”?
Which lessons have we learned? Amidst all these proposals,
it is not easy to extract truly innovative ideas, solid scientific
trends, effective and robust solutions.
For data-driven methods, lacking theoretical models, experi-
mental results take a fundamental role, and hence experimental
protocols are extremely important. Let us consider supervised
methods, for the time being, with perfectly aligned training
and test sets, that is, disjoint training and test samples drawn
from the very same dataset/distribution. Experimental evidence
shows that, in this setting, deep learning methods work ex-
tremely well. In ideal conditions this is not so important,
because then simpler approaches work just equally well. In
challenging conditions, however, when forensic traces are
weak, deep learning, especially very deep architectures, can
provide a large performance gain with respect to conven-
tional methods. In Table I, to compare approaches based on
handcrafted features, deep networks, and very deep networks,
accuracy results on DeepFakes videos are reported from [178].
In the presence of strong compression, there is a gap of
about 15% between machine learning and deep learning, and
15% more using a very deep network. This can make a
big difference in practical applications, since many standard
processing steps tend to weaken forensic traces, as when video
are routinely compressed and resized as soon as they are
uploaded on a social network. This is certainly a remarkable
achievement of deep learning methods.
However, a validation protocol which considers only perfect
alignment is intrinsically weak, and falls short of its goal.
Indeed, perfect alignment is a very favorable setting, which
is easily obtained in simulations and rarely observed in real-
world operations. Main causes of misalignment are: i) the tar-
get media asset has been generated or manipulated in ways that
were never seen in the training set; ii) its processing history
is not covered by training set samples. Both situations are
extremely common. New forms of manipulations are invented
by the day, and cannot be represented in the training set when
they first appear. Moreover, images and videos can undergo
a long sequence of transformations [200] and accounting for
all of them is not reasonable. Working well with aligned
TABLE I
RESULTS OF CNN-BASED METHODS ON DEEPFAKES
Accuracy
Uncompressed High Quality Low Quality
Handcrafted features 99.03% 77.12% 65.58%
Deep network 99.28% 90.18% 80.95%
Very deep network 99.59% 98.85% 94.28%
training and test sets, possibly carved from the same dataset,
is not very informative. Therefore, it is important to adopt
stronger validation protocols, including experiments where
training and test set are unrelated and account for realistic
and challenging conditions, such as compression, multiple
manipulations, unseen forgeries. In the absence of such strong
validation, the results of the supervised deep learning methods
do not yet appear completely convincing.
One-class methods seem to perform reasonably well also in
challenging real-world conditions, and this looks as a promis-
ing approach to deal with such complex scenarios. Clearly,
for one-class methods, no alignment problem exists. On the
other hand, the fundamental question of what can be labelled
as “pristine” remains open. Many operations are not malicious
and should not be detected, yet they change the statistics of
an image with respect to what is output by a camera. For
example, one can apply histogram equalization to improve
the appearance of a photo, but that is not a forgery. Even
resizing has a different meaning based on the context: it is a
sign of a manipulation when used to change the dimension of
an object to perform splicing, while it is an innocent operation
when used to save space. For these reasons, looking for local
anomalies seems to be a good direction, which overcomes
ambiguities. In general, the training phase is crucial to make
a network work in the correct and desired way, and there is a
strong need of large datasets that try to cover many different
situations.
VII. DATASETS
For learning based approaches, it is of paramount impor-
tance to have good data for training. Moreover, to assess
the performance of new proposals, it is important to com-
pare results on multiple datasets with different features. The
research community has made considerable efforts through
the years to release a number of datasets with image and
video manipulations. However, not all of them possess the
right properties to support the development of learning-based
methods. Many such methods, in fact, split a single dataset
in training, validation, and test set, a practice that may easily
induce some forms of polarization or over-fitting if the dataset
is not built with care. In this Section, the most widespread
datasets are described, and their features briefly discussed.
A. Images
Table II reports a list of datasets with manipulated images.
Some of them are rather old and necessarily outdated, and
some even present important flaws. It is surprising to see recent
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papers relying on unsuited datasets and presenting them as
challenging testbeds.
The Columbia (color) dataset, presented in 2006 [201],
is one of the first ones made available to the forensics
community. It comprises 180 forged images with splicing,
some examples of which are shown in Figure 13. Despite its
merits, it presents several major problems: i) it is unrealistic,
since the forgery is clearly visible; ii) the spliced region is not
subject to any type of post-processing; iii) only uncompressed
images are present; iv) only four cameras are used to take both
the host images and the spliced regions. Moreover, it is not
clear how to define the forged areas, given that both regions
come from pristine data. For these reasons, this dataset should
not be used both in the training and the testing phase, nor to
perform fine-tuning, otherwise overly optimistic results will
be observed.
Also widespread is the Casia dataset, proposed in 2013
[202]. In the first version (v1) splicings present sharp bound-
aries and are easily detectable. The second version (v2),
however, is more realistic, and inserted objects are post-
processed to better fit the scene. Nonetheless, it exhibits a
strong polarization, highlighted in [203]. In fact, tampered
images and pristine images are JPEG compressed with differ-
ent quality factors (the former at higher quality). Therefore,
a classifier trained to tell tampered and pristine images apart,
may instead learn their different processing history, thereby
working very well on test images from the same dataset, and
very poorly on new unrelated images.
Another dataset with splicings is DSO-1 [5] a subset taken
from the IEEE Image Forensics Challenge (unfortunately, the
original datasets prepared for the challenge is not available
anymore and the ground truths were never released by the
organizers). Here, the manipulations are carried out with great
care and most of them are realistic. Images are saved in the
uncompressed PNG format, but most of them had been JPEG
compressed before. Minor problems are the fixed resolution
of images, and missing information on how the dataset was
created, e.g., how many cameras were used, which could help
interpreting results.
Forgeries of various nature are present in the Realistic
Tampering Dataset proposed by Korus in [204]. The manipu-
lated images, all uncompressed, appear indeed very realistic,
although there is only a small number of them. The dataset
includes also the PRNU patterns of the four cameras used to
acquire all images, enabling the use of sensor-based methods.
The Wild Web Dataset [205] is a collection of real cases
from the internet. Therefore, there are no certified information
on the manipulations, but the authors made a huge effort to
gather different versions of the same images and to extract
meaningful ground-truths.
Many datasets have been proposed specifically for copy-
move forgery detection [91], [92], [206], [95], [207], the
forgery most studied in the literature. Some of them are
designed to challenge copy-move methods by adding multiple
operations on the copied object, such as rotation, resizing,
change of illumination. However, the more an object is
modified, the more detectable it becomes for methods based
on camera artifacts, since the distance between its statistical
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Fig. 13. Examples from the Columbia dataset. Top: images with splicing,
bottom: ground truth. In all cases the inserted region is very large and
obviously detectable.
properties and those of the background increases.
There is also a realistic dataset to test double JPEG compres-
sion [76] and, recently, a synthetic dataset of single and double
JPEG compressed blocks with 1,120 quantization tables, has
been released, aimed at training deep networks [122].
To test algorithms in the wild, the U.S. National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released several
large datasets [208]. The first one, NC2016, contains some
redundancies: each spliced photo is presented four times, JPEG
compressed at low and high quality, and with and without post-
processing on the splicing boundaries. These multiple versions
are meant to study how performance depends on such details.
However, this feature is never exploited in the literature. On
the contrary, several papers split the dataset in training and
test carelessly, including the same image parts in both sets,
and artificially boosting the performance. In subsequent years,
NIST published three more datasets, NC2017, MFC2018,
MFC2019, without the above redundancies. These datasets
are very large and present a great variety of manipulations,
resolutions, formats, compression levels, acquisition devices.
Moreover, multiple manipulations are often carried out on the
same image and even on the same objects. In several cases, a
separate development dataset is associated with the main one
to ensure correct training of learning-based methods. Overall,
they represent a very challenging and reliable testbed for new
proposals.
Recently, a very large dataset has been released in [209],
called DEFACTO, which collects over 200,000 images with
realistic manipulations, including splicings, copy-moves, re-
movals and face morphing. Another very large dataset is the
PS-Battles Dataset, where a collection of 102,028 images
is presented, each containing the original image but also
a varying number of manipulated versions [210]. For what
concern facial modifications a dataset has been proposed
in [139] which contains around 4,000 real and manipulated
images, using two different face swapping algorithms. A large
dataset of GAN-generated images using available software
[192], [172] are available at [211].
B. Videos
Only a few datasets are available for experiments on videos,
but their number has been growing rapidly in this last year.
Creating high-quality realistic forged videos using standard
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TABLE II
LIST OF DATASETS INCLUDING GENERIC IMAGE MANIPULATIONS
dataset ref. year manipulations # prist. / forged image size format
Columbia gray [212] 2004 splicing (unrealistic) 933 / 912 128×128 BMP
Columbia color [201] 2006 splicing (unrealistic) 182 / 180 757×568 - 1152×768 TIF, BMP
MICC F220 [92] 2011 copy-move 110 / 110 722×480 - 800×600 JPG
MICC F2000 [92] 2011 copy-move 1,300 / 700 2048×1536 JPG
VIPP [76] 2012 double JPEG compres. 68 / 69 300×300 - 3456×5184 JPG
FAU [91] 2012 copy-move 48 / 48 2362×1581 − 3888×2592 PNG, JPG
Casia v1 [202] 2013 splicing, copy-move 800 / 921 374×256 JPG
Casia v2 [202] 2013 splicing, copy-move 7,200 / 5,123 320×240 − 800×600 JPG, BMP, TIF
DSO-1 [5] 2013 splicing 100 / 100 2048×1536 PNG
CoMoFoD [206] 2013 copy-move 260 /260 512×512, 3000×2000 PNG, JPG
Wild Web [213] 2015 real-world cases 90 / 9,657 72×45 − 3000×2222 PNG, BMP, JPG, GIF
GRIP [95] 2015 copy-move 80 / 80 1024×768 PNG
RTD (Korus) [204] 2016 splicing, copy-move 220 / 220 1920×1080 TIF
COVERAGE [207] 2016 copy-move 100 / 100 400×486 TIF
NC2016 [208] 2016 splicing, copy-move, removal 560 / 564 500×500 − 5,616×3,744 JPG
NC2017 [208] 2017 various 2667 / 1410 160×120 − 8000×5320 RAW, PNG, BMP, JPG
FaceSwap [139] 2017 face swapping 1,758 / 1,927 450×338 - 7360×4912 JPG
MFC2018 [208] 2018 various 14,156 / 3,265 128×104 − 7952×5304 RAW, PNG, BMP, JPG, TIF
PS-Battles [210] 2018 various 11,142 / 102,028 130×60 − 10,000×8558 PNG, JPG
MFC2019 [214] 2019 various 10,279 / 5,750 160×120 − 2624×19,680 RAW, PNG, BMP, JPG, TIF
DEFACTO [209] 2019 various – / 229,000 240×320 − 640×640 TIF
GAN collection [172] 2019 GAN generated 356,000 / 596,000 256×256 − 1024×1024 PNG
editing tools is very time-consuming, hence, only a few small
datasets are available on-line featuring classic manipulations,
like copy-moves and splicings [97], [149], [98]. Many more,
and much larger datasets include video manipulated with AI-
based tools [215], [191], [178], [216], [217], [218], [219],
[220] (Table III).
In [215] a face-swapping video dataset, DF-TIMIT, has
been built, with 620 deepfake videos obtained with a GAN-
based approach. The original data come from a database which
contains 10 videos for each of 43 subjects. 16 couples of
subjects were manually chosen from the database in order
to generate videos with swapped faces from subject one
to subject two and viceversa, producing both a low quality
and a high quality video. In [191], instead, proposes the
Fake Face in the Wild Dataset, FFW, comprising only 150
manipulated videos which, however, show a large variety
of approaches, including splicing and CG faces, using both
manual effort and completely automatic procedures. Finally,
in [221], manipulated videos retrieved from the web have been
collected in a dataset that includes 200 fake videos and 180
real videos. An extended version of this dataset also presents
near-duplicates found on the web.
The first large dataset with automatically manipulated faces,
FaceForensics++, has been proposed in [178]. It contains 1,000
original videos downloaded from the YouTube-8M dataset
[222] and 4,000 manipulated videos obtained from them by
using four different manipulation tools. Two of them are based
on computer-graphics and two on deep learning, two perform
changes of expression and two face swapping, Figure 14 shows
a few examples. The dataset is available in uncompressed and
H264 compressed format, with two quality levels, in order to
stimulate developing methods robust to compression. Recently,
Google and Jigsaw contributed the dataset with 3,000 more
manipulated videos, created ad hoc using 28 actors [217]. Also
in [216] a new deepfake video dataset has been introduced,
called Celeb-DF. It comprises 5,639 manipulated videos, the
real videos are based on publicly available YouTube video
clips of 59 celebrities of diverse genders, ages, and ethnic
groups. Forged videos are created by swapping faces for each
pair of the 59 subjects using an improved deepfake synthesis
method. Instead in [218] the first release of the dataset used
for the Facebook DeepFake Detection Challenge (DFDC) is
described. It is composed by 4,113 deepfake videos created
using two different synthesis algorithms on the basis of 1,131
original videos featuring 66 enrolled actors. The final dataset
made available for the Kaggle competition [219] (started on
December 2019) is instead much larger. It comprises 100,000
manipulated videos and around 19,000 pristine ones. A very
recent dataset has been built in [220], comprising 10,000 fake
videos built using 100 actors and applying 7 perturbations,
like color saturation, blurring and compression, with different
parameters for a total of 35 possible post-processing so as to
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TABLE III
LIST OF DATASETS INCLUDING VIDEO MANIPULATIONS
dataset ref. year manipulations # prist. / forged frame size format
DF-TIMIT [215] 2018 deepfake – / 620 64×64 − 128×128 JPG
FFW [191] 2018 splicing, CGI, deepfake – / 150 480p, 720p, 1080p H.264, YouTube
FVC-2018 [221] 2018 real-world cases 2,458 / 3,957 various various
FaceForensics++ [178] 2019 deepfake, CG-manipulations 1,000 / 4,000 480p, 720p, 1080p H.264, CRF=0, 23, 40
DDD [217] 2019 deepfake 363 / 3,068 1080p H.264, CRF=0, 23, 40
Celeb-DF [216] 2019 deepfake – / 5,639 various MPEG4
DFDC-preview [218] 2019 deepfake 1,131 / 4,113 180p − 2160p H.264
DFDC [219] 2019 deepfake 19,154 / 100,000 240p − 2160p H.264
DeeperForensics-1.0 [220] 2020 deepfake 50,000 / 10,000 1080p –
Face2Face
NeuralTextures Deepfake
Target Video Source Video
FaceSwap
Fig. 14. Example manipulated videos from FaceForensics++. A single original
video (top-left) is manipulated by four different tools (Face2Face, NeuralTex-
tures, FaceSwap, DeepFake) using information drawn from a different source
video.
better represent a real scenario.
C. Original media
Since some methods work on anomaly detection and are
trained only on pristine data, it makes sense to describe also
a list of useful publicly available resources based on datasets
of authentic images and videos. Of course, they can also be
used to simulate different types of manipulation and carry out
initial experiments on a synthetic dataset. They are commonly
used for source/camera identification, but this task is strictly
related to media forgery detection. For example, in case of a
composition, by identifying the origin of image patches, one
can detect the presence of multiple sources.
The Dresden image database [223] is the most popular one.
It contains over 14,000 JPEG images captured by 73 digital
cameras of 25 different models. Raw images, instead, can
be found in the RAISE dataset [224], composed by 8,156
images taken by 3 different cameras. A further dataset was
released for the 2018 Kaggle competition [225] on camera
model identification and is also available on-line. It is com-
posed by 2,750 images from 10 different camera models. A
dataset that contains SDR (Standard Dynamic Range) and
HDR (High Dynamic Range) images has been presented in
[226]. A total of 5,415 images were captured by 23 mobile
devices in different scenarios under controlled acquisition
conditions. The VISION dataset instead [227] includes 34,427
images and 1,914 videos from 35 devices of 11 major brands.
Media assets are both in their original format and as they
appear after uploading/downloding on various platforms (Face-
book, YouTube, WhatsApp) so as to allow studies on data
downloaded from social networks. Another mixed dataset,
SOCRATES, is proposed in [228]. It contains 6,200 images
and 680 videos captured using 67 smartphones of 14 brands
and 42 models. Finally, this year the video-ACID database
has been published [229], with over 12,000 videos from 46
physical devices of 36 different models.
VIII. COUNTERFORENSICS
In multimedia forensics, like in other security-related fields,
one should always account for the presence of an adversary
which actively tries to mislead the analyses. In fact, a skilled
attacker, aware of the principles on which forensic tools rely,
may enact a number of counter-forensic measures on purpose
to evade detectors [230]. Forensic tools should prove robust to
such attacks, as well as to all real-world conditions that tend
to impair the performance observed in laboratory. Therefore,
the many counterforensics methods designed to fool current
detectors represent a precious help towards the development
of multimedia forensics, since they highlight the weaknesses
of current solutions and stimulate research for more robust
ones [231].
A large body of literature concerns attacks targeted to spe-
cific forensic methods, which try to exploit their weaknesses.
For example, some methods try to hide traces of resampling
that manifest as strong peaks in the Fourier domain [232]. Also
sensor traces, and especially PRNU fingerprints, are popular
targets because of their importance in forensics. So, methods
have been proposed to remove the true device fingerprint from
an image, and also to inject the fingerprint of a different
device in it [230]. Besides hindering source identification,
these attacks can reduce the ability to discriminate manipulated
from pristine data. As said before, however, they stimulated the
design of more robust detectors [233], and then more powerful
attacks [234], in an arms race typical of such two-player
games. Attacks to traditional methods will not be explored,
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Fig. 15. Fooling deepfake detectors. A suitable inconspicuous adversarial
noise pattern can be added to a deepfake video to mislead the CNN detector
into classifying it as pristine.
referring the reader to a very recent review by Barni et al.
[235], and focus instead on counterforensics for deep learning-
based methods.
Back in 2014, in the context of image recognition, it has
been shown [236] that convolutional neural networks are
extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks. By injecting a
suitable inconspicuous noise pattern in the target image, the
attacker can induce the network to change classification in
any desired way (see Figure 15). Actually, this is not a
new problem, the vulnerability of machine learning had been
known for several years, especially in applications like spam
and malware detection, and has been thoroughly studied [237]
in the adversarial machine learning field. In any case, these
alarming findings have spawned intense research on this topic
in computer vision.
In multimedia forensics, some early papers [238], [239]
focused on attacking machine learning detectors based on
the rich model handcrafted features, obtaining mixed results
with high complexity. Indeed, attacking CNNs seems to be
easier and more effective [240]. Backpropagation provides a
strong help to design gradient-based adversarial perturbations.
However, differently from what happens in computer vision
[241], it appears that adversarial noise designed to fool a
specific CNN architecture does not transfer to different ar-
chitectures trained for the same task [242], [243]. This is
probably because the adversarial noise lives in the same space
(high frequencies) where major forensic clues live. Lossy
compression is a further intrinsic defence against adversarial
attacks [244]. Indeed, strong lossy compression, ubiquitous in
real-world scenarios, removes not only useful forensic traces
but also adversarial noise, reducing the effectiveness of such
attacks [245]. Table IV shows some experimental results on
Face2Face manipulated videos [178]. Attacks crafted with
FSGM [241] with various strengths ( = 1, 2, 3) have been
applied only on faces (so as to not distort the visual quality,
Figure 15) and the performance of a CNN-based detector are
evaluated. With  = 3 the detector accuracy becomes close to
50% (random choice). However, if videos are compressed, a
large part of the adversarial noise is removed, and the detector
performance improves again.
Recently, some methods have been specifically developed to
attack CNN detectors for multimedia forensics applications. In
[246] a GAN-based architecture is proposed to hide the traces
of median filtering in order to fool state-of-the-art CNN-based
detectors. A different perspective is followed in [247], where
a generative method has been proposed to falsify the camera
TABLE IV
RESULTS ON FACE2FACE MANIPULATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF
ADVERSARIAL NOISE AND COMPRESSION
Accuracy
Uncompressed High Quality Low Quality
no attack 99.93% 98.13% 87.81%
low attack 80.43% 94.83% 85.83%
medium attack 56.37% 89.93% 83.30%
strong attack 52.23% 82.00% 80.30%
model traces. The attack does not only fool camera model
classifiers, but reduces also the power of forensic analyses
based on traces of in-camera processing. Along this same
direction, in [248] an autoencoder-based method is proposed
to remove GAN fingerprints and impair the performance of
systems designed to detect GAN-generated images. Instead
[249] proposes a GAN-based architecture with a twofold goal,
to inject traces of a real camera in synthetic images and, at
the same time, reduce peculiar traces of GAN generation.
Therefore, attacked images cannot be recognized anymore as
computer-generated and are instead recognized as real images
of the target camera. The attack takes place in a black-box
scenario, with no information on the attacked detectors.
Notably, all these approaches preserve a very good image
quality, with no perceivable visual artifacts, demonstrating the
urgent need of stronger and more robust detection methods.
IX. FUSION
A system with the ambition to provide reliable decisions
about the integrity of images and videos must necessarily
integrate multiple tools, to cover most, if not all, the operating
conditions of interest. In fact, each individual method works
under suitable hypotheses, and can become completely useless
when these do not hold. For example, a tool for copy-move
detection will not help in case of a splicing. Fusing multiple
tools, however, is not only important to widen the spectrum
of detectable forgeries, but also to improve the detection
capability with respect to each single one. In fact, the traces
to be detected are usually extremely weak, and can be easily
masked by intentional attacks, as described in the previous
Section, and even by standard processing steps. Therefore,
the integration of multiple tools designed to detect similar
attacks with different approaches, may be expected to improve
performance, and especially robustness, to both innocent and
malicious disturbances. On the other hand, maximizing the
number of clues is standard practice in investigative proce-
dures.
The typical workflow of a forensic tool is to extract suitable
low-level features from the original data, process them to
obtain a scalar score or a probability vector, and eventually
process the latter (score thresholding, max probability choice)
to make the final decision. Fusion may take place at all three
levels, called feature, measurement, and abstract level, with
pros and cons. As observed in [250], working at the feature
level presents serious drawbacks when a large number of tools
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Fig. 16. Using information fusion to detect multiple manipulations. Different
tools provide different pieces of information, which may locally agree,
disagree, or being complementary. A human expert can likely make sense of
all such clues, but transferring this expertise to a computer may be difficult.
are involved, especially for the number of features to deal
with, and the problem of creating representative datasets for
all possible situations of interest. On the other hand, with
abstract-level fusion, precious information may have been
already discarded, reducing the ability to exploit cross-tool
dependencies. Working at the measurement level may be a
reasonable compromise in between these two extremes. In
any case, while fusion is certainly a major asset to improve
performance, it is not obvious how to combine wildly different
pieces of information in a sensible way, as shown by the
example of Figure 16. Here, an expert can easily understand
that manipulations occurred, and where, but transferring such
a skill to a machine is not trivial. Another example is shown
in Figure 17, where the two versions of Emma Gonzalez are
analyzed using a CNN-based localization approach. For the
first image the heatmap shows that there is no manipulation,
while for the second image the forged area is highlighted.
What is interesting is that a further manipulation was carried
out by the malicious user, who also replicated some text inside
the poster, which is detected by a copy-move based detector.
Indeed, to create a realistic forgeries multiple modifications
were needed and hence multiple traces were left. How to fuse
these results is clearly not trivial.
Despite the intense research activity in multimedia foren-
sics, there has been limited attention on the fusion of diverse
and complementary tools. One of the first contributes is the
study of Bayram et al. [113] back in 2006. Their results clearly
show that detectors based on fusion dominate all individual
base detectors in terms of accuracy, and the gain is more
significant when operating at the abstract level. In [250],
[251] fusion is addressed in a more systematic way, rely-
ing on the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence [252]
to meaningfully combine multiple tools at the measurement
level. The DST provides a methodology to include concepts
like uncertainty, reliability, and compatibility in the decision
process. In fact, to attribute the correct importance to a detector
score, one should take into account its overall reliability, the
level of confidence associated with the specific decision and
its compatibility with other detectors. Experiments in [250],
[251] show that the DST approach, with reasonable fusion
rules, outperforms consistently all individual tools and also
abstract-level fusion, thanks to the use of richer information. It
even outperforms machine-learning fusion in the absence of a
training set well-aligned with the test set, a recurrent situation
in multimedia forensics. In [253] several forensic tools, based
on complementary hypotheses, are fused following various
strategies, with results confirming that measurement-level fu-
sion is more effective than abstract-level fusion. In [204],
instead, contextual information is taken into account by means
of prior Markovian models, while in [254] multi-scale fusion
is investigated to improve the localization accuracy of tools
operating in sliding-window modality.
It is worth mentioning that fusion is a common characteristic
of all the winning approaches in several forensic challenges,
like in the IEEE Forensics challenge [120], [96], the fraud
detection contest on receipts [255] or the Camera Model
Identification Challenge organized for the 2018 IEEE Signal
Processing Cup and hosted on Kaggle [225]. More in general,
in the data science community, it is standard practice to com-
bine the probability vectors output by multiple deep networks,
even by simple averaging. Empirically, this fusion improves
robustness when moving from training to test data, more and
more with the increasing number of networks, in line with the
“wisdom of the crowd” principle.
X. FUTURE WORK
As clearly shown by this survey, in the last fifteen years
there has been intense research on multimedia forensics, and
great progresses. Nonetheless, many issues remain unsolved,
new challenges appear by the day and, eventually, most of the
road seems to be still ahead of us. This is not so surprising,
though. For sure, the advent of deep learning has given
extraordinary impulse to both media manipulation methods
and forensic tools, opening new research areas. A more
fundamental reason, however, is the two-player nature of this
research field. The presence of skilled attackers is a guarantee
that no tool will protect us forever, and new solutions will be
always necessary to cope with unforeseen menaces. With this
premise, it is important trying to identify the most promising
areas for future research.
A first topic is fusion. As manipulations get smarter and
smarter, individual tools will become ever less effective against
a wide variety of attacks. Therefore, multiple detection tools,
multiple networks, multiple approaches must be put to work
together, and how to best combine all available pieces of
information should be the object of a more sustained research.
Besides multi-tool fusion, also multi-asset analysis should be
pursued. More and more, the individual media assets should
be analyzed together with all correlated evidence. A picture or
a video used to spread a fake news should not be studied in
isolation but together with the accompanying text [256], audio
[257], and all available contextual information [258]. Also, the
approach can be changed based on the availability of additional
information, e.g., metadata or near-identical versions of the
image/video under test. Eventually, a whole array of semantic-
level analyses should be pursued, as envisioned by the recent
initiative launched by DARPA on Semantics Forensics.
Focusing more specifically on deep learning-based tools,
the main technical issue is probably the (in)ability of deep
networks to adapt to situations not seen in the training phase.
This issue emerges in several circumstances. First of all, media
18
Fig. 17. From left to right: the pristine Emma Gonzalez image, the heatmap obtained using a CNN-based localization method, the manipulated image, and the
corresponding heatmap obtained with the same CNN-based detector. The last image shows the output of a copy-move detector operating on the manipulated
version. Therefore, multiple clues were found: splicing and cloning. Also in this case deciding the right fusion strategy is not easy.
assets undergo a number of innocent processing steps, like
compression, resizing, rotation, re-capturing, etc., that modify
significantly their high-order statistics, so precious for forgery
detection. Besides innocent transformations, malicious ones
should be also considered, designed specifically to disguise
forensic clues. It is unlikely that all combinations of such
transformations can be represented in a training set. Therefore,
higher robustness should be pursued by other means. Also, to
deal with the rapid advances in manipulation technology, deep
networks should be able to adapt readily to new manipulations,
without a full re-training, which may be simply impossible
for lack of training data or entail a catastrophic forgetting
phenomena.
Another hot issue for deep learning-based methods is in-
terpretability. The black-box nature of deep learning makes it
difficult to understand why a certain decision is made. A deep
network may correctly classify a cat’s picture as “cat”, but
we do not know exactly which specific features motivated this
decision. Of course, this is a serious issue for some forensic
applications. For example, a judge would hardly base decisions
only on statistical bases. More in general, being able to track
the reasoning of a deep network would allow to improve its
design and training phase, and provide higher robustness with
respect to malicious attacks.
Lastly, we underline a resurgent of interest on active au-
thentication methods [259], [260]. In past decades, a large
body of research was produced on digital watermarking [261].
There is now much interest in blockchain technology [262], in
criptography [263], and even new active methods have been
proposed to ensure the integrity of digital media [264] or to
protect individuals from becoming the victims of AI attacks
[265]. As we said before, despite its long history, multimedia
forensics appears to be still in full development, with high
demands from industry and society and many answers yet to
be given.
XI. CONCLUSION
Fifteen years ago multimedia forensics was a niche field
of practical interest only for a restricted set of players in-
volved in law enforcement, intelligence, private investigations.
Both attacks and defences had an artisan flavor, and required
painstaking work and dedication.
Artificial intelligence has largely changed these rules. High-
quality fakes now seem to come out from an assembly line
calling for an extraordinary effort on part of both scientists and
policymakers. In fact, today’s multimedia forensics is in full
development, major agencies are funding large research initia-
tives, and scientists form many different field are contributing
actively, with fast advances in ideas and tools.
It is difficult to forecast whether such efforts will be able
to ensure information integrity in the future, or some forms of
active protection will become necessary. This is an arms race,
and one part is no smarter than the other. For the present time,
a large arsenal of tools is being developed, and knowing them,
the principles on which they rely, and their scope of application
is a prerequisite to protect institutions and ordinary people.
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